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INTRODUCTION
Before the Depression made the prospect of federal intervention in economic affairs
feasible, moral reformers had spent decades making the idea of governmental—first local,
later federal—intervention in personal affairs desirable. Before organizations like the
American Federation of Labor sought governmental protection from the ills of capitalism,
groups like the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice fought for governmental
protection from the dangers of hedonism. Before Congress delivered the National
Industrial Recovery Act or the Agricultural Adjustment Act, it passed the Federal Lottery
Act and the White Slave Traffic Act. And before the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of
the Commerce Clause to shape the market, it endorsed using it—along with the Postal and
Taxation Clauses, too—to mold society. Before, that is to say, America had a regulatory
state, it had a vice state—a national regime geared toward preventing, regulating, and
punishing “immoral” behavior.
As Kyle G. Volk, John W. Compton, and Jessica R. Pliley deftly illustrate in their
respective first books, the political, constitutional, and legal roots of this vice state, fully
realized and entrenched in the decades prior to the New Deal, are deep, multifaceted, and
interwoven. They span nearly a century, from the Age of Andrew Jackson to the heart of
the Progressive Era. They encompass policy domains from alcohol to gambling to
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prostitution. They involve actors ranging from preachers to judges, legislators to law
enforcement. Considered collectively, Volk, Compton, and Pliley’s excavation of these
roots offer a profoundly revisionist story of the modern American state as an entity that is
set in motion well before Black Tuesday, concerned with a very different sort of
governmental endeavor than price controls and labor standards, and legitimized less by the
needs of the nation in the face of punctuated crisis than by an overarching vision of the
good society against persistent threats to its moral fabric.
Of course, an argument for repositioning the forces of sin, vice, and iniquity as
central in American life is hardly new—in history, in religion, or in political science. 1
What makes these books stand out—certainly in conjunction with one another, but to some
degree in isolation as well—is the staggering diversity and intensity of moral politics they
describe. Going beyond a mere shared conception that constructions of morality and
immorality have been inextricably linked to claims about American political well-being or
democratic survival, what Volk, Compton, and Pliley provide is a fascinating glimpse into
the multiple avenues of practicing—both advocating and contesting—moral politics.
MORAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
The most sprawling of the three books is easily Kyle G. Volk’s Moral Minorities
and the Making of American Democracy. Temporally, the book is largely rooted in the
immediate antebellum period—the 1840s and 1850s—but, topically, it ranges broadly
from Sunday laws to liquor licensing to interracial marriage, showing in each case how, in
an era of democratic expansion, minority rights became a fundamental part of participatory
politics. In his telling of the counterintuitive turn to democracy to accomplish minority
wishes, Volk presents a tale of moral politics through the people and delivers insight into
the moral roots of modern political debates.
With the simultaneous moralism and populism of the Jacksonian era as his backdrop,
Volk situates the birth of “minority-rights politics” as a response to democratic, Christian
attempts to regulate lives in ways that distinctly accorded with majoritarian sentiment. 2
According to the dominant logic of the era, the Sabbath should be observed vigilantly,
liquor licenses should be issued rarely (if at all), and cross-racial interaction should be as
limited as possible. But Volk’s concern is not so much with understanding the advocates
of those propositions as with tracing the development of a resistance to them. That
resistance, Volk recounts, was not merely against the content of the laws but against the
idea, as ascendant then as ever before, that, in a democracy, it was the right of the majority
to rule as it saw fit. In response, Volk’s protagonists—Jews and Catholics, immigrants and
liquor dealers, abolitionists and black Northerners—powerfully articulated the idea that
protecting minority rights was a “critical obligation of democratic government.”3 In doing
so, Volk maintains, they “pioneered a tradition of political participation and minorityrights advocacy that subsequent generations of activists would adopt.”4
This newfound relevance of countermajoritarianism—this more “pluralistic
1.
2.
3.
4.

See, e.g., JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2003).
KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 5.
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conception of democracy” with minority rights viewed as integral to “moral freedom,
cultural diversity, and social equality”—was not born of a single moment or a common
cause.5 Rather, it was built across constituencies that did not necessarily see eye-to-eye
with one another but at least shared a belief that those without power should not be
subjected to an arbitrary or overzealous exercise of it. Whether Jews and Seventh Day
Baptists objecting to the assumptions of a “Christian nation” implied by Sunday closing
laws,6 liquor dealers and working-class drinkers chafing at direct democracy measures that
limited alcohol consumption as intrusion into private spheres, 7 or abolitionists criticizing
racial separation (whether in marital vows, school classrooms, or in public transportation)
as impeding the basic equality necessary to a flourishing democratic society, 8 minorities
of various stripes targeted public opinion and sought to shape public policy by mobilizing
at the mass level, forming advocacy groups, and offering—publicly and loudly—rival
conceptions of what real democracy entailed, expected, and required. The resultant
minority-rights project, then, was at once one of ideational formation and grassroots
organization—that is to say, about both articulating ideas and developing the networks
essential to spreading them. In both ways, then, it was, as Volk recounts, a profoundly
democratic endeavor. While the opponents of moral reform used whatever tools might
have been available to them, they did not abandon the democratic sphere but enmeshed
themselves more fully in it. They argued and demonstrated, petitioned and published,
networked and coordinated. Evincing a “steadfast commitment to democracy, even in the
face of persistent democratic oppression,” their efforts represented democratic action to
texture democratic government.9
And, at the end of the day, they made a difference, bringing forth from the golden
age of American democracy not so much more democracy as a richer and more nuanced
democracy. Minority rights, of course, were not a novel idea, with James Madison in
particular having been deeply concerned with majoritarian will steamrolling minority
interests as he drafted the blueprint for American government. But what Volk’s account
shows is a transformation of those rights from ones narrowly protective of “propertied
aristocrats, slaveholders, and intellectuals” to a “rallying cry of . . . socioeconomically
diverse Americans.”10 Democracy, under that transformation, could be a system where the
minority and majority alike could press their claims and fight for their rights. Even though
majoritarian moral reformers—those opposed to alcohol, gambling, and prostitution—
would, over the next few decades, win more often than they lost, the establishment of the
minority rights tradition would offer a powerful legacy for opponents to draw upon in
resisting them.
MORAL POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Where Volk opts for breadth of subject, John W. Compton offers a sharp challenge

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 6–7.
See id. at 37–68.
VOLK, supra note 2, at 69–100, 167–205.
See id. at 101–66.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 205.
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to conventional understandings in The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution. The
prevailing consensus that Compton targets, even if he only wades partially into the debate
until the end of the book, concerns the “constitutional revolution” of 1937, with a reading
and sources that cast entirely new light on the origins of that momentous change in
American constitutionalism. Working his way through not only judicial decisions but also
the religious developments that surrounded them, Compton demonstrates the peculiar turn
to courts to accomplish majority values. In so doing, his rendering of mid to late nineteenth
and early twentieth century jurisprudence as one of moral politics through judges offers a
novel perspective on the moral roots of the modern constitutional order.
At the heart of Compton’s puzzle—and, in some sense, his explanation for both the
constitutional revolution and the rise of “living constitutionalism”—is a clash between
“rapidly evolving mores, on the one hand, and the generally rigid principles and
institutional structures of the constitutional order, on the other.”11 After all, while the
moral convictions and sensibilities of any society should naturally be expected to change,
that society’s formal constitution establishes an order and fixes its contours—not just for
a period of time but, at least until it is replaced, for all time. Compton’s entry into this
timeless political dilemma between dynamism and ballast is the period following the
Second Great Awakening, when religious reawakening resulted in a shift of social mores
toward immorality. Far from merely wishing to control “national sins” such as alcohol and
gambling, post-Great Revival citizens sought to eradicate them completely. 12 But in
heeding a religious authority to rid the nation of vice, reformers encountered an obstacle
in the form of the civic authority of a Constitution that was understood to subordinate
“traditional moral and religious purposes to the worldly goals of protecting property and
promoting economic development.”13 As a result, in order to pursue the America they
imagined, reformers needed to redefine the constitutional commitments underpinning the
America in which they lived.
Where this clash—between those advocating measures for moral betterment and a
document interpreted to allow for economic betterment—ultimately occurred most
consequentially was in courtrooms, with state and federal judges alike charged with the
“task of negotiating” the disjunct between the drive to “purge ‘national sins’” and “the
ideals of the traditional order.”14 Surveying first the state and later the federal judicial
landscape, Compton leads a jurisprudential tour of both geographic diversity and doctrinal
instability. At first, as the mores of the Second Great Awakening made themselves
manifest in law, judges were amenable only to the regulation of liquor and lotteries (the
two primary subjects of Compton’s analysis), casting a far more skeptical eye at reformerpressed laws that sought to prohibit alcohol sales or gambling outright, which judges
thought hostile to contractual and due process rights. 15 But within a few decades—during
which the Jacksonian party system effectively collapsed, opening up a new Republican
Party that eagerly welcomed evangelical voters and rewarded their loyalty with judges

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 2 (2014).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 38, 51.
See id. at 52–72.
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amenable to morals legislation16—both state appellate courts and the Supreme Court had
given up resistance to moral reform.17 A previously firm attachment to the Contracts
Clause was replaced by an expansive conception of the police power. The requisites of
due process were massaged to align with the concession that private rights should not limit
public power. The limitations on power authorized by the Commerce Clause were
complicated by an understanding that the boundaries of the federal system were fluid
rather than fixed. By the dawn of the century, the very institution that had always been the
staunchest defender of the economic constitutional order had essentially abandoned the
core principles of that order.
Where exactly does the revisionist take on the constitutional revolution emerge in
all this? Well, as it so happens (and as Compton describes in the last third of the book),
when, following waves of intense opposition from (in sequence) Populists, Progressives,
and labor in the first few decades of the twentieth century, 18 the Supreme Court ultimately
gave way to the demands of New Deal reformers in 1937, the legacy of moral reformers—
of vice regulation and the judicial approval given to it—was of critical importance.19
Lawyers relied, as Compton details, on an idea that had been central to the liquor and
lottery cases—namely, that “legal concepts and categories were inherently indeterminate
and that traditional constitutional principles merely served to mask the judiciary’s
subjective preference for laissez-faire economic policies.”20 And, after resisting through
1936, the Court ultimately agreed, discarding its erstwhile attachment to economic rights,
the system of dual federalism, and an assumption that the Constitution had fixed meaning
regardless of the historical circumstances or the views of the public. Despite the fact that
there has long been a robust debate about the reasons for and causal factors leading to the
constitutional revolution, neither the original scholarship emphasizing external political
forces21 nor the revisionist scholarship emphasizing internal legal forces 22 has seen what
Compton makes vivid here: the extent to which it was the Court’s embrace of vice
regulation that laid the intellectual groundwork for the remaking of the constitutional
universe.
MORAL POLITICS AND LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
If Volk’s book is characterized by its extensive scope and Compton’s defined by its
incisive revisionism, then Jessica R. Pliley’s Policing Sexuality: The Mann Act and the
Making of the FBI is marked by its eye-opening depth. Her focus on a single (albeit
incredibly troubled and exceedingly fascinating) piece of legislation might initially seem
unduly restrictive, but it is, in fact, precisely that focus that allows for an interrogation that
is simultaneously granular in detail and kaleidoscopic in viewpoint, offering grounded and
16. COMPTON, supra note 11, at 73–90.
17. See id. at 91–132.
18. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE
COURT (1994).
19. See COMPTON, supra note 11, at 133–76.
20. Id. at 134.
21. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).
22. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998).
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provocative claims about criminal justice, gender, and the intersection between them in
the early to mid-twentieth century. With the help of rich primary sources (particularly
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) case files), Pliley illustrates how the turn to law
enforcement to accomplish elite aims wrought changes—in government and society —far
beyond those realms the Mann Act was intended to regulate. Indeed, it is precisely in this
brand of moral politics through agents that we find the moral roots of the modern legal
apparatus.
Ostensibly a developmental history of the Mann Act, Pliley’s book sits at the nexus
of—or, maybe, more accurately, illustrates how the Mann Act unquestionably produces
and structures the nexus of—the creation of the FBI and the sexual behavior of women
during the first half of the twentieth century. Also known as the White Slave Traffic Act,
the Mann Act made it a crime to transport women or girls across state lines “for immoral
purposes.”23 Targeted most obviously at commercial prostitution, the statute is known for
ensnaring men from heavyweight boxing champion Jack Johnson to silent screen film star
Charlie Chaplin and, perhaps, for giving rise to a story that was thought to have (at least
partially) inspired Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita.24 In Pliley’s hands, however, it becomes
much more: a glimpse into how “the shadow of the law” can shape political institutions
and social behavior alike.25 Animated throughout by the leitmotif of “borders”—between
states, between local and national authority, between public and private sexual behavior,
between men and women, innocence and guilt, bodies and persons26—Pliley elucidates
how a single piece of federal legislation created a “new governable sphere for sexuality”
that allowed for and justified the expansion of an investigative law enforcement agency
into a truly national and unquestionably powerful source of state capacity. 27
Following the changing constructions of the Mann Act—and the varying visions of
family life and female sexuality that both shaped and emerged from those constructions—
across several decades, Pliley’s account is too exhaustive and too replete with undulations
to recap with any semblance of completeness. At various times, the proto-FBI—it was
known simply as the Bureau of Investigation until 1935—was confused about the meaning
of the Mann Act,28 hesitant about enforcing it too broadly, 29 overzealous in expanding its
mandate,30 and dedicated to using it to eliminate specific kinds of sex crimes. 31 Over a
23. White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2421–2428 (2012)).
24. Nabokov even name-checks the statute in the book, with Humbert Humbert noting:
Only the other day we read in the newspapers some bunkum about a middle-aged morals offender
who pleaded guilty to the violation of the Mann Act and to transporting a nine-year-old girl across
state lines for immoral purposes, whatever these are. Dolores darling! You are not nine but almost
thirteen, and I would not advise you to consider yourself my cross-country slave, and I deplore the
Mann Act as lending itself to a dreadful pun, the revenge that the Gods of Semantics take against
tight-zippered Philistines.
VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA 150 (1955).
25. JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 216 (2014).
26. Id. at 3–4.
27. Id. at 208.
28. Id. at 60–83.
29. Id. at 84–105.
30. PLILEY, supra note 25, at 106–58.
31. See id. at 159–206.
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roughly three-decade span, women, by turn, were seen—by agents and prosecutors,
newspapers and social movements—as innocent victims to be protected, wartime
distractions to be managed, sexual deviants to be prosecuted, public health dangers to be
quarantined, and marital threats to be surveilled. Revealing how the “double standard of
sexuality”32 that allowed male promiscuity but demanded female chastity and fidelity was
not only an idea circulating in the populace but an output generated by law, Pliley shows
how the formal propagation and codification of a gendered (to say nothing of racialized,
classist, and ageist) sphere of intimacy was facilitated through bureaucratic priorities and
coercive authority decidedly lacking in public transparency.
Throughout it all, the transformation of the FBI, hitherto a nascent entity operating
mostly out of Washington and with only a limited presence beyond the Northeast, into a
nationalized, free-wheeling, strategically-managed crime-fighting organization stands out
as a remarkable development. Against the assumption that the Bureau’s rise occurred
largely through its work in “domestic political policing of ideological and racial
minorities,”33 Pliley sees the story of sexual policing of women as fundamental to the
growth of institutional functions, individuals, and resources. The creation of the White
Slave Division—and the establishment of “white slave officers,” a veritable army of
deputized civilian volunteers, within it—is a telling microcosm of the broader story. 34
Charged with the “overwhelming, if unclear, task of policing immorality” nationwide, the
Bureau’s augmented jurisdiction would ultimately lead to more agents to track down the
purveyors of vice and, subsequently, to more money to aid them in ferreting out sin. 35 In
the end, it was a group of “subnational bureaucratic actors” that spread “federal polic[e]
power throughout much of the country,” establishing both the structural architecture of
and a “more aggressive model” for ensuring that the nation’s laws were enforced, and
majority’s moral values imposed, upon the citizenry as a whole.36
BUILDING THE AMERICAN VICE STATE
Even though Volk, Compton, and Pliley clearly did not write their books to be in
formal conversation with one another, they fit remarkably well together—not merely as
different case studies of a common theme or different manifestations of a common
dynamic, but as interlocking pieces of grand historical trajectory: the construction of the
American vice state. With Volk, Compton, and Pliley’s books as our guides, it is more
possible than ever to sketch out the complex, multi-generational, multi-stage development
of a regime that persists, albeit in modified and amended form, even to this day. Laying
the books’ insights on top of (rather than merely adjacent to) one another, I can identify at
least five sequential processes at work.
First, ideologically, there was the public construction or framing of certain
undesirable behaviors as “vice” in the first place. Occurring during periods when
American values were decidedly in flux, with a clash between first a lingering Puritan
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 88–98.
PLILEY, supra note 25, at 87.
Id. at 91, 104.
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sensibility and later an emerging Victorian morality, on the one hand, and an incipient
proto-libertarianism animating political culture, on the other hand, Volk, Compton, and
Pliley highlight moments that proved ripe for reinterpreting and renegotiating the norms
and values of the extant political order. The idea that moral weakness—the propensity to
ingest harmful substances, to engage in financially profligate activity, to participate in
sexually deviant behavior—was itself societally detrimental may have fit quite naturally
within strands of political thinking that emphasized communal betterment, but it was
hardly self-evident or universally accepted in a society usually characterized as uniformly
liberal. Instead, the public costs of private sin needed to be articulated, dramatized, and
inculcated. And, indeed, by framing vice as both a blight on individual capacity and a drain
on social resources in newspapers, literature, and popular culture, reformers transformed
what might otherwise simply have been considered personal problems of immorality into
a civic problem with sufficient political and economic ramifications so as to render it an
appropriate target of popular opprobrium and governmental supervision.
Second, organizationally, there were activist campaigns—directed at both national
and sub-national policymakers—to leverage such attention in service of proposing
concrete and tangible action. As Volk, Compton, and Pliley illustrate, many such
campaigns came from familiar social reformers and the organizations they left behind, but
at least some of the campaigns (especially in the Gilded Age) appear to have been funded
by the very breed of wealthy capitalists that would—and did—abhor interventionist
government when it turned its regulatory gaze toward business and industry. The
combination of these forces provided a powerful one-two punch of activist mobilization
and elite bankrolling that left campaigns for vice regulation well positioned not only to
make noise but also to achieve results.
Third, legislatively, there were seemingly endless local, state, and eventually
congressional battles to secure those results by drafting and enacting city ordinances, state
constitutional amendments, and federal legislation that might simultaneously serve to
satisfy the interests of reformers and further the aims of legislators alike. While the
regulation of moral peccadilloes had long been subject to the sorts of state laws and
especially local ordinances integral to Volk and Compton’s analyses, it was only in the
late nineteenth century that the trend jumped to the federal level. Indeed, influenced by an
array of groups in favor of reform-minded policymaking and capitalizing on public panics
about the societal victims of so-called “victimless crimes,” lawmakers sought not so much
to overcome as to bolster state policies and formulate a comprehensive approach to the
moral—and, by extension, political, economic, and social—decay of Americans. The
answer, as the central characters in both Compton and Pliley’s stories saw it, lay in national
standards with national enforcement; it lay, in other words, in a programmatic approach to
extinguishing vice through nationwide regulation.
Fourth, jurisprudentially, there was the judicial—and, indeed, ultimately Supreme
Court—sanctioning, or constitutionalizing, of that regulation as part of a vision that
seemed to push, both creatively and expansively, the bounds of national regulatory
authority. Central to this construction, as Compton details, was a constitutional universe
that integrated established understandings of governmental power, federalism, and judicial
authority into a powerful and theretofore unseen admixture. Combining these elements in
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service of something roughly approximating an unenumerated federal police power to
regulate for the health and morals of the citizenry, the Court effectively rendered claims
that vice regulation lacked legal legitimacy moot and provided a constitutional imprimatur
for the notion that national government could join state and local governments in seeking
to rid the American citizenry of sin.
Fifth, administratively, there was the enforcement, by local and federal officials
alike, of a broad and expansive conception of not only the targets of (judicially-approved)
statutes regulating immoral behavior but also their mandates for action under them. As
Pliley documents, this process both lent enormous leeway to and placed enormous pressure
upon police forces, federal agents (as well as the civilians deputized by them), and
attorneys to identify, trap, and punish those trafficking in vice. The need for investigative
energy required an expansion of resources—both money and manpower; the demand for
prosecutorial success necessitated a wide net, “flexible” tactics, and unified purpose
dictated from the top. Together, they transformed national bureaucratic capacity on
criminal justice matters so as to make vice not merely regulable in theory but actually
punishable in practice.
From demand to mobilization, provision to legitimation to implementation, there is
a fascinating, complex, and, until now, largely unappreciated story of political
development unfolding here. Indeed, considered not as independent vectors but as
overlapping, sequential stages in a macro-political transformation, these five processes—
framing, proposing, enacting, constitutionalizing, enforcing—yield nothing less than an
expansive, interventionist, regulatory government, one that both helps to contextualize the
transformation of the political order that comes three decades later with the New Deal and
establishes a legacy that remains visible in American politics to this day.
One broader lesson here—not one that Volk, Compton, or Pliley drive home directly
but one that implicitly jumps out from the shared force of their work all the same—is that
our standard narrative about the origins of “modern” American life overemphasizes the
economic at the expense of the social. To be sure, questions of political economy were
instrumental in the development of the contemporary American state, but the path to the
New Deal economic order is not one fundamentally about economic regulation because
the ideational, organizational, legislative, jurisprudential, and administrative roots of the
New Deal economic order reside in the realm of social control. This story of deep concern
with non-economic aspects of community life—what citizens are accepted as members of
the community, the responsibilities citizens have to their communities, the privileges and
benefits citizens receive from their communities in return—is largely forgotten once the
New Deal’s thoroughgoing transformation of the government’s role in the national
economy becomes the story of how modern American politics works. But, reading Volk,
Compton, and Pliley, it is hard to escape the idea that the economic concerns about
planning and regulation in a capitalist system are intimately linked to the social dimensions
of how people behave and practice their everyday lives. The notion that there are social
roots of economic structures—that the logic of social regulation suggests a logic for
economic regulation later, that the campaigns for social regulation guide campaigns for
economic regulation later, that the justification for social regulation establishes a
justification for economic regulation later—is not necessarily how we conceptualize things
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today. But, to the extent that New Deal economic interventionism can be traced to the
social control initiatives—the morals regulation, the vice state—from the Age of Jackson
to the Progressive Era, it was the directionality of the relationship during a wide swath of
American history.
As central as social control has been to American political history, it should be little
surprise that it remains an integral domain of contemporary American government. After
all, the American vice state whose historical roots are under examination in these books
has endured as, in many eyes, a profoundly illiberal policy regime for more than a century.
Alcohol may have recovered from Prohibition to become an accepted feature of American
life, but the other two sites of moral politics that undergird much of these books—
gambling and prostitution—remain, to different degrees and in different ways, outside the
mainstream. Gambling, though obviously somewhat destigmatized with the rise of statesponsored lotteries in the mid-twentieth century and the prevalence of tribal gaming in the
late twentieth century, remains illegal in most forms (casinos or sports betting, for
example) in most states as well as federally, with recent flare-ups in a number of states
over the classification of “daily fantasy sports.” Prostitution, a condoned sexual practice
in much of the developed world, remains contrary to the laws of the United States as well
as every American state save Nevada. And for all the many nodes of debauchery and
depravity that fill the pages of Volk, Compton, and Pliley’s books, there is an important
one that does not make an appearance: recreational drugs.37 Perhaps the primary target of
the contemporary vice state, drugs remain—recent electoral successes in legalizing
marijuana in a number of states notwithstanding—legally prohibited, culturally decried,
and harshly punished at both the state and federal level.
That the continued potency of such a regime persists as a source of controversy
should not be the least bit surprising given the various strands of American liberalism it
imperils. For some, the subjects regulated and the behavior proscribed not only reside
within the bounds of what many Americans have long deemed private morality and what
others would at least regard as “victimless” crimes but also present opportunities for
exacerbating racial and socioeconomic inequities that already run rampant throughout the
criminal justice system. For others, the very existence of a vice state is proof positive of
how easily the federal government—purportedly one of enumerated powers only—can use
its creative capacities to accomplish something it might not otherwise be constitutionally
empowered to do. To politicians, pundits, and (presumably) much of the populace, those
dueling concerns might suggest a dispute that is inescapably a product of our
hyperpolarized era rather than one that has been raging on-and-off for nearly two centuries,
shaping and constituting American political debate, constitutionalism, and institutions in
the process. Yet, far from a creation of Ronald Reagan or the Christian Coalition, the
American vice state has roots deep in our historical consciousness and influence far across
the political agenda. Amidst morally-tinged questions about governmental obligations in
healthcare and personal safety, and in light of morally-drenched debates about abortion

37. Indeed, if one were looking for something to add to the works under examination here, it would be a book
detailing the historical political development of narcotics, which were similarly characterized by everything from
impassioned campaigns to aggressive enforcement and are, as seen in the “War on Drugs,” similarly durable as
an aspect of the vice state.
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and gay rights, we would be wise to recognize—and, subsequently, to learn from—the
moral roots of the modern American polity.
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